Utah Law Review
Volume 2017 | Number 3

Article 4

6-2017

The Disability Politics of Abortion
Mary Ziegler
Florida State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Disability Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Law and Politics
Commons
Recommended Citation
Ziegler, Mary (2017) "The Disability Politics of Abortion," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2017 : No. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2017/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

THE DISABILITY POLITICS OF ABORTION
Mary Ziegler*
Abstract
With Ohio considering passing the nation’s second ban on
abortions motivated by Down Syndrome, the relationship between
abortion and disability law has taken on new importance. Disabilitybased bans raise unique legal, moral, and political difficulties for those
supporting legal abortion. The core commitments supporting legal
abortion—including sex equality—stand in some tension with justifying
abortion in the case of a fetal defect or disability.
Given the problems with disability-based bans, it may seem that
there is no urgent need to resolve these tensions. Disability-based
statutes likely create an impermissible undue burden under Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern v. Casey and seem impossible to enforce.
However, historical analysis shows that the bans under consideration
may transform the abortion debate even if they are never enforced.
First, this history explains the puzzling lack of discussion of
disability in abortion politics, illuminating the political payoff of
disability-based justifications used by activists otherwise committed to
equal treatment. Second, this history makes clear the perils that a
disability-based ban creates for supporters of legal abortion. Raising the
salience of “selective” abortion may allow pro-lifers to win over
ambivalent voters and legislators who are concerned about disability
discrimination. Moreover, the arguments made prominent by such a law
can easily justify other restrictions that might fare better in the courts,
including limitations on access to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnosis
and prohibitions on abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy.
To avoid the danger illuminated by the history studied here, prochoice attorneys and legislators should push for laws that actually
reduce the odds of disability-based abortion. Ironically, parents who
might not otherwise choose to terminate a pregnancy in the case of
disability do so because they feel they have no choice, particularly given
the bleak outcomes faced by many disabled adults confronting both
poverty and unemployment. Reproductive justice should include a
commitment to adequate funding for the programs on which disabled
adults and children depend, as well as the removal of perverse legal
incentives that discourage disabled Americans from taking steps that
would make employment more realistic. Guaranteeing meaningful
*
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choices inevitably involves the removal of the discrimination and
tangible obstacles that make abortion more common in cases of fetal
defect or disability.
INTRODUCTION
After Indiana passed the second law in the country banning abortions on the
basis of certain fetal disabilities, the relationship between abortion and disability
law took on new importance.1 Disability-based bans raise unique legal, moral, and
political difficulties for those supporting legal abortion.2 The core commitments
1

On the passage of the Indiana law, see, for example, Danielle Paquette, Doctors
Respond to Indiana Banning Abortions Because of Down Syndrome, WASH. POST (Mar.
25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/25/doctors-respondto-indiana-banning-abortions-because-of-down-syndrome/?utm_term=.99f13440cf59
[https://perma.cc/858D-KN53]. A federal judge subsequently blocked enforcement of the
law on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm & Mitch Smith, Federal Judge
Blocks Indiana Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/01/us/federal-judge-blocks-indiana-abortion-law.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/2A9FBT8P] (suggesting it was an “illegal limit on a woman’s long-established constitutional
right”). Ohio considered this, but ultimately did not pass a similar measure. See, e.g.,
Martin Pengelly, John Kasich Pledges to Sign Bill Banning Abortions Due to Down’s
Diagnosis, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
sep/20/john-kasich-ohio-abortion-bill-downs-syndrome [https://perma.cc/P6TV-DHNM]
(“Kasich has said he will sign a state bill currently under debate that would ban abortions
carried out because a child has Down’s syndrome.”); V.v.B., Ohio’s Controversial
Abortion Bill, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/demo
cracyinamerica/2015/08/down-syndrome
[https://perma.cc/V9YU-YMG3]
(“Ohio
lawmakers are expected to approve a measure that would ban doctors from performing an
abortion if the patient wants to avoid giving birth to a child with Down syndrome.”). For
the North Dakota law already in effect, see, for example, Associated Press, National
Digest: N.D. Limits Abortions: Ind. Upholds School Voucher Program, WASH. POST (Mar.
26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/national-digest-nd-limits-abortionsind-upholds-school-voucher-program/2013/03/26/efd82ea8-964f-11e2-8b4e-0b56f26f28de
_story.html?utm_term=.c09c29239a28 [hereinafter National Digest] [https://perma.cc/RD3
X-FJBK]; Liz Szabo, Earlier Prenatal Tests Usher in “Heartbreaking” Decisions:
Advocates for Those with Down Syndrome Tell the World Theses Lives Are Worth Living,
USA TODAY, May 2, 2013, at 1A; James MacPherson, Judge Blocks “Invalid” N.D.
Abortion Law, BOS. GLOBE (July 23, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/
2013/07/22/federal-judge-delays-north-dakota-abortion-law/ZSVH9J92WKYEeIDz9ei1B
M/story.html [https://perma.cc/DQE5-ZX4S].
2
See, e.g., Sonia Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other
Theories of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1564 (2008) (“Prenatal testing and PIGD therefore present a
dilemma if we want to understand reproductive rights in terms of equality.”); Maya
Manian, Lessons from Personhood’s Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on
Women’s Health, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 75, 104–05 (2013) (treating disability discrimination as
a legitimate concern but concluding that existing antiabortion laws did little to protect the
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supporting legal abortion—including sex equality—stand in some tension with
justifying abortion in the case of a fetal defect or disability.
Given the problems with disability-based bans, it may seem that there is no
urgent need to resolve these tensions. Disability-based statutes likely create an
impermissible undue burden under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey3 and seem impossible to enforce. However, historical
analysis shows that the bans under consideration may transform the abortion
debate even if they are never enforced.
First, this history explains the puzzling lack of discussion of disability in
abortion politics, illuminating the political payoff of disability-based justifications
used by activists otherwise committed to equal treatment. Second, this history
makes clear the perils that a disability-based ban creates for supporters of legal
abortion. Raising the salience of “selective” abortion may allow pro-lifers to win
over ambivalent voters and legislators who are concerned about disability
discrimination. Moreover, the arguments made prominent by such a law can easily
justify other restrictions that might fare better in the courts, including limitations
on access to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnosis and prohibitions on abortion
after the 20th week of pregnancy.
To avoid the danger illuminated by the history studied here, pro-choice
attorneys and legislators should push for laws that actually reduce the odds of
disability-based abortions. Ironically, parents who might not otherwise choose to
terminate a pregnancy in the case of disability do so because they feel they have no
choice, particularly given the bleak outcomes faced by many disabled adults, such
as poverty and unemployment. Reproductive justice should include a commitment
to adequate funding for the programs on which disabled adults and children
depend, as well as the removal of perverse legal incentives that discourage
disabled Americans from taking steps that would make employment more realistic.
Guaranteeing meaningful choices inevitably involves the removal of the
discrimination and tangible obstacles that make abortion more common in cases of
fetal defect or disability.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the legal and political
history of abortion and disability starting in the 1960s. Part II places the new wave
of antiabortion laws in historical context and explains why they do nothing to
resolve the tension between legal abortion and disability rights. Part III identifies
several legal proposals that would help remove some of the reasons that disability
still prompts some parents to seek abortion, and Part IV concludes the discussion.

disabled); Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating
Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 73–
74 (2012) (proposing an intermediate scrutiny test for restrictions on access to noninvasive
prenatal genetic diagnosis in recognition of the fact that “the collective result of individual
reproductive decisions has the potential to create significant discrimination and societal
harm”).
3
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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I. DISABILITY AND ABORTION IN LEGAL HISTORY
In the early 1970s, in explaining the progress of the campaign to legalize
abortion, Harriet Pilpel of Planned Parenthood argued that a rise in birth defects
had “brought home to the American public the scope, complexity and immediacy
of the [abortion] question.”4 As Pilpel recognized, disability politics had helped to
turn the repeal of abortion restrictions into a pressing political question.
Thalidomide, a drug used to control morning sickness, caused fetal defects in the
United States and thousands more abroad.5 Following a rubella epidemic in the
early 1960s, women infected in the first trimester also confronted dramatically
higher odds of birth defects.6
When more women worried about disability in pregnancy, amniocentesis and
other technologies designed to identify chromosomal abnormalities also became
more effective and widespread.7 As it seemed increasingly possible to identify
disabilities before birth, pro-choice physicians, lawyers, and activists made
disability-based justifications a centerpiece of the demand for the reform of
abortion laws.8 Even after the movement demanded the complete repeal of all
abortion restrictions, arguments based on fetal disability or defect continued to
figure centrally in the pre-1973 argumentative agenda of organizations like the
National Abortion Rights Action League (then the National Association for the
Repeal of Abortion Laws, NARAL).9
4

Alan F. Guttmacher & Harriet F. Pilpel, Abortion and the Unwanted Child, 2 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 16, 16 (1970).
5
See, e.g., SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION
AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 14 (1991) (explaining that thalidomide causes
fetal deformity); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 83 (Brian
Berry & Samuel L. Popkin eds., 1984) (stating that “[t]he thalidomide cases were very
much in the mind” of the California Junior Chamber of Commerce when considering
whether or not to continue pregnancy to term in difficult situations).
6
See, e.g., LESLIE J. REAGAN, DANGEROUS PREGNANCIES: MOTHERS, DISABILITIES,
AND ABORTION IN MODERN AMERICA 60–63 (2010) (explaining that thalidomide had
severely harmed ten thousand or more children).
7
See, e.g., Cynthia M. Powell, The Current State of Prenatal Genetic Testing in the
United States, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 44, 45–46 (Erik Parens &
Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) (explaining that these technologies were capable of detecting
many disabilities, and by the 1980s, most women were being offered the screenings during
pregnancies); RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF
AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA 29–30 (1999) (explaining how the technology of prenatal
diagnosis continues to evolve at a rapid pace).
8
For examples of these arguments, see Society for Science & the Public, Need New
Abortion Laws, 86 SCIENCE NEWS LETTER 397, 397 (1964); Society for Science & the
Public, Abortion Laws Condemned, 90 SCIENCE NEWS, 320, 320 (1966). Part I discusses
these claims at greater length.
9
For examples of these arguments, see NARAL SPEAKER AND DEBATER’S
NOTEBOOK (1972), in NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, RECORDS OF THE
NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, 1968–1976: A FINDING AID, Carton 7;
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After the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,10 pro-choice groups mostly
moved away from the disability-based arguments used in the campaign for
legalization.11 By contrast, through the later 1970s and early 1980s, pro-lifers
stepped up arguments that disability discrimination represented an important
reason to reverse Roe.12 In this analysis, “eugenic” abortion laws had exposed the
larger damage legalization would do to the society—the denigration of all
vulnerable and disabled persons before and after birth. This argument played an
important role in pro-life efforts to discredit the opposition and win allies not
invested in banning abortion. While organizations like NARAL downplayed the
potential of fetal defects, related arguments remained a part of activists’ defense of
both prenatal genetic testing and late-term abortion.
Starting in the mid-1990s, when Congress dealt with the effort to ban dilation
and extraction (D&X),13 or “partial-birth abortion,” both social movements
returned to familiar arguments about disability and abortion. In arguing against the
ban, pro-choice groups insisted that providers used D&X primarily in cases of
severe disability.14 While implicitly suggesting that such abortions might be more
justifiable, abortion opponents replied that physicians performed D&X for reasons
of convenience.15
Until the recent introduction of “prenatal discrimination laws,”16 disabilitybased justifications remained a strong argument for access to abortion. However,
LARRY LADER TO NARAL BOARD MEMBERS RE: THE DAMAGE TO THE ABORTION
MOVEMENT FROM THE SECOND HOUR OF THE TV REPORT ON THE AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON POPULATION CONTROL (1972), in THE NARAL PAPERS, CARTON 7, DEBATING THE
OPPOSITION FOLDER, SCHLESINGER LIBRARY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY [hereinafter LARRY
LADER TO NARAL BOARD MEMBERS].
10
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11
On arguments stressed by pro-choice leaders in the aftermath of Roe, see MARY
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 121–26 (2015).
12
For examples of these arguments, see Marlene Cimons, The Activist Surgeon
General: It Used to Be a Figurehead Position. Then C. Everett Koop Came Along., L.A.
TIMES
(Sept.
14,
1986),
http://articles.latimes.com/1986-09-14/magazine/tm12280_1_surgeon-general [https://perma.cc/34FG-9ZUB]; Fred Marc Biddle, Bernardin
Defends
Stance
on
Infertility,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Apr.
30,
1987),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-04-30/news/8702020199_1_cardinal-bernardinvatican-document-vatican-congregation [https://perma.cc/8NNH-9B4Z].
13
On the early debate in Congress, see David Espo, Late Term Abortion Ban Passes
Congress, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 1996, at A1.
14
See, e.g., Abortion Foes Rip Clinton for Veto Dole Criticizes ‘Extreme’ Position,
ATL. J. CONST., Apr. 11, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Abortion Foes Rip Clinton] (explaining
that severe fetal defects prompted five women to have abortions).
15
See, e.g., Roy Rivenburg, Partial Truths, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1997, at 8 (suggesting
through a newspaper ad that the reasons people seek-late term abortions include not being
able to “fit into prom dress”).
16
For an example of such a model law, see AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, PRENATAL
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE FOR THE 2016
LEGISLATIVE YEAR (2015), http://www.aul.org/downloads/2016-Legislative-Guides/
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after 2000, when pro-life groups began experimenting more with laws banning
abortion on the basis of sex or gender, disability-based bans gained support.17
Nonetheless, as the history of disability and abortion suggests, the current
understanding of the relationship between Down Syndrome, other conditions, and
abortion is neither inevitable nor unchanging.
A. Disability Serves as a Justification for Abortion Reform and Repeal
Prior to the 1950s, the controversy centered on abortion in the case of
hereditary defects. For example, in 1936, a committee chartered by the British
Medical Association agreed that abortion should be legal when there “is reasonable
certainty that serious disease will be transmitted to the child,” including in cases of
hereditary blood disorders and mental illness.18 From roughly 1900 to 1945, in the
United States and abroad, a powerful eugenic legal reform movement contended
that a variety of undesirable behaviors, including sexual promiscuity and
criminality, had genetic origins.19 The eugenic legal reform movement championed
statutes restricting access to marriage and mandating the sterilization of the unfit.20
In the early twentieth century, the movement enjoyed widespread influence,
prompting the introduction of more than 30 sterilization laws and forging an oftentroubled partnership with early proponents of family planning, including Margaret
Sanger and Planned Parenthood.21 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the earliest eugenic
justification for abortion relied on the same kind of genetic explanation that had

Abortion/Prenatal_Nondiscrimination_Act_-_2016_LG.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM6L5V6H].
17
For examples of the push for these laws, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
18
T.N.A. Jeffcoate, Indications for Therapeutic Abortion, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 582, 585
(1960).
19
On the history of the eugenic legal reform movement, see DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN
THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 92–94 (1985);
WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND EUGENICS FROM THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 2–3 (2001); STEFAN KÜHL, THE NAZI
CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM (1994);
MARK LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED STERILIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1–4 (2008).
20
On the laws advocated by the eugenic legal reform movement, see KEVLES, supra
note 19, at 99–100; LARGENT, supra note 19, at 65–66, 127–28.
21
On the passage of eugenic sterilization laws, see LARGENT, supra note 19, at 65–66,
127–28. On the relationship between the early family planning movement and eugenic
legal reformers, see JEAN H. BAKER, MARGARET SANGER: A LIFE OF PASSION 162–63,
201–22 (2011); NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER SCIENCE, AND THE
ANATOMY OF NATIONALISM 130–48 (2003); see also Mary Ziegler, Eugenic Feminism:
Mental Hygiene, The Women’s Movement, and the Campaign for Eugenic Legal Reform,
31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 211, 211–31 (2008) (discussing early feminism’s role in
eugenics policy formation during the early twentieth century).
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fueled the movement for compulsory sterilization.22 At a time when eugenic
concerns seemed applicable to a small group with known hereditary disorders, the
kind of justification invoked by the British Medical Association did little to
influence abortion laws. Since relatively few Americans had a known hereditary
disorder, eugenic justifications seemed likely to authorize only a small number of
abortions.
After World War II, the eugenic legal reform movement found itself in
retreat.23 Scientists discredited many of the core arguments of the eugenic legal
reform movement, and legislators shied away from enforcing laws that closely
resembled those applied in Nazi Germany.24 While the idea of eugenics lost
influence, however, disability-based justifications for abortion gained support.
Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s, as researchers learned that environment
contributed significantly to the existence of fetal defects, a lack of abortion access
in cases of fetal abnormality seemed likely to affect more Americans.25 As early as
1941, physicians found evidence that rubella, a contagious viral disease,
significantly increased the risk of fetal defects.26 The 1950s witnessed the
publication of a wide variety of studies suggesting that fetal defects resulted not
only from genetics but also from the environment and a complex interaction
between the two.27
In the 1950s and 1960s, news broke that thalidomide, a drug produced in
Germany, had resulted in over 10,000 cases of severe birth defects.28 Although the
drug was never licensed in the United States, the thalidomide controversy drove
home that non-genetic factors could produce fetal abnormalities, and several
children in the United States suffered from severe birth defects traceable to the
drug.29

22

See, e.g., Jeffcoate, supra note 18, at 585 (listing potential fetal abnormalities such
as serious disease or hereditary blood disorders that will be transmitted to the child).
23
On the movement’s loss of influence, see ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF
SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1–2 (1992); NATHANIEL DEUTSCH, INVENTING
AMERICA’S WORST FAMILY, EUGENICS, ISLAM, AND THE FALL AND RISE OF THE TRIBE OF
ISHMAEL 16 (2009); LARGENT, supra note 19, at 116–17.
24
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
25
See infra Part I.
26
Herbert Packer & Ralph Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and
Politics, 11 STAN. L. REV. 417, 434 (1959).
27
JOHN E. MORISON, FOETAL AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY 15 (1952); F. Clarke
Fraser & T.D. Fainstat, Causes of Congenital Defects, 82 AM J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN
593, 593–96 (1951); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 555 (1962).
28
SCOTT AINSWORTH & THAD HALL, ABORTION POLITICS IN CONGRESS: STRATEGIC
INCREMENTALISM AND POLICY CHANGE 4–5 (2011); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION
AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 12 (1987); REAGAN, supra note 6, at 60–63 (2010).
29
STAGGENBORG, supra note 5, at 14; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 266 n.13.
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The 1962 case of Sherri Finkbine, a middle-class, white television presenter,
made disability-based abortion more compelling.30 Finkbine had taken thalidomide
during her pregnancy and became deeply concerned about fetal defects.31 After a
hospital refused Finkbine’s request for an abortion, she filed a lawsuit, using the
testimony of psychiatrists to establish that it would harm her to “have a deformed
baby.”32 After the birth of several disabled children whose mothers had taken
thalidomide, a court dismissed Finkbine’s suit, concluding that if physicians and
prosecutors agreed that her life would be threatened by continuing her pregnancy,
there was no case or controversy to resolve.33 Fearing prosecution, Finkbine and
her husband traveled to Sweden, a country that authorized abortions in cases of
fetal defect.34
Finkbine’s struggles helped bolster demand for legalizing abortion, at least
when a child might be born with severe abnormalities.35 In 1962, Rabbi Israel
Margolies, later a prominent pro-choice figure, explained:
The truly civilized mind would be hard put to devise a greater sin than to
condemn an innocent infant to the twilight world of living death, or to
sentence two innocent parents to a life term of caring for . . . a creature
who is a grotesque mockery of God’s image.36
While thalidomide use in the United States was never widespread, a 1963–
1964 rubella epidemic reshaped public attitudes.37 Estimates of the odds of fetal
defects for a woman exposed to rubella in the first trimester of pregnancy ran from
10% to 90%.38 While abortion laws at the time did not authorize abortions in cases
of fetal defect, some hospitals agreed to perform the procedure for rubella
victims.39 However, in the winter of 1963, when a rubella epidemic hit the East
Coast, the disability politics of abortion took on new urgency.40 That year,
Massachusetts recorded five times the number of cases treated in the previous year,
30

On the influence of Finkbine’s case, see SARA DUBOW, OURSELVES UNBORN: A
HISTORY OF THE FETUS IN MODERN AMERICA 64–66 (2011); RICKIE SOLINGER,
PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA
179–81 (2005); REAGAN, supra note 6, at 58–59.
31
REAGAN, supra note 6, at 58–59.
32
Abortion Suit Is Filed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1962, at 25.
33
Mother Loses Round in Legal Battle for Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1962, at 9;
Mother, Rebuffed in Arizona, May Seek Abortion Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1962, at
19.
34
U.S. Mother Seeks Aid from Sweden, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1962, at 64.
35
See sources cited supra note 30.
36
Rabbi Attacks Abortion Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1962, at 76.
37
REAGAN, supra note 6, at 1–25.
38
Packer & Gampell, supra note 26, at 434.
39
Edwin M. Schur, Abortion and the Social System, 3 SOC. PROBS. 94, 99 (1955).
40
On the rubella epidemic in 1963, see FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960 163–64 (1999); DUBOW, supra note 30, at
65.
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while New York City battled a sixteen fold increase.41 By 1964, New York City
reported more than 10,000 new cases.42 At a time when any pregnant woman faced
the possibility of a rubella infection and all that it entailed, the need for new
abortion laws seemed evident to a larger group of people.
In the aftermath of the thalidomide and rubella controversies, family-planning
organizations and physicians more often used disability as a justification for
legalizing abortion. As early as 1959, the American Law Institute (ALI) had set out
a proposed reform law that would authorize abortion under certain circumstances,
including cases in which a child would be born with a “grave physical or mental
defect.”43 Supporters of abortion used fears of fetal disability and defect as a key
reason to reform abortion laws. In 1964, speakers at the Planned Parenthood
Federation of America convention argued that abortion should be legal, at least in
cases of fetal defect.44 Dr. Robert E. Hall presented related justifications as the
most obvious reason for abortion reform.45 In cases of defect or disability, he
argued that abortion would be “condoned by [physicians’] consciences, accepted
by their peers and demanded by their patients.”46
Other supporters of abortion reform used similar reasoning. “Our present law
prohibits termination of pregnancy with the result that many infants are forced to
suffer through their blighted lives, a burden to themselves, their families, and to
society,” argued Robert Force, the author of a proposed abortion reform bill in
Indiana.47 “For society to compel this result borders on the grotesque.”48 Ruth
Lidz, another supporter of abortion reform, put the point bluntly: “As a physician, I
believe that in a proven abnormality of a fetus it could be immoral and inhumane
to subject the mother, her family and, perhaps, society to the burdens of bearing,
nuturing [sic] and rearing an abnormal child.”49
Given the physical suffering and societal discrimination some believed
“abnormal” children faced, reformers used bans on abortion in cases of fetal defect
to showcase the irrationality and cruelty of broad abortion bans. At a time when
few agreed on when, if at all, abortion should be legal, reformers framed disabilitybased abortions as obviously moral and medically necessary. These arguments
helped to explain the progress of ALI-style bills in a handful of states over the
course of the 1960s. Twelve states introduced such laws in less than a decade.50
41

REAGAN, supra note 6, at 57.
Id.
43
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 22, 1959).
44
Need New Abortion Laws, supra note 8, at 397.
45
Abortion Laws Condemned, supra note 8, at 320.
46
Id.
47
Robert Force, Legal Problems of Abortion Reform, 19 ADMIN. L. REV. 364, 371–72
(1967).
48
Id. at 372.
49
Ruth W. Lidz, Review: More Light on Abortion, FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 63, 63 (1971).
50
See, e.g., GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION,
AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 185 (2005) (listing some of the states
that enacted ALI-type laws by 1970); LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE
42
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The fetal-defect exception written into the ALI model appeared to be a part of the
blueprint for future abortion laws.
Moreover, arguments about defects and disabilities fit well alongside an
existing reform message about the benefits of allowing women to have only
wanted children. Throughout the 1960s, Planned Parenthood had painted a dire
picture of the consequences of compulsory pregnancy, including a perceived spike
in juvenile delinquency.51 Planned Parenthood leader William Vogt similarly tied
juvenile delinquency to uncurbed population growth and unwanted children. In
criticizing the delinquency reforms recently championed by then New York State
Attorney General Jacob Javits,52 Vogt wrote: “It is well known that unloved and
‘rejected’ children are prone to become neurotics. Much juvenile misbehavior
shows a marked neurotic pattern.”53 Vogt further contended that some working
mothers, many of them likely poor, were guilty of “maternal neglect.”54 In either
case, Vogt insisted, “Perhaps these poor youngsters should never have been born at
all to parents, who, because of their own deficiencies, are unable to provide their
children the emotional and spiritual environment indispensable to their health.”55
Because Planned Parenthood already used arguments about the harm done to the
larger society by unwanted children, claims about fetal defects fit well in the
organization’s argumentative agenda.
While the ALI proposal was in ascendancy, technological advances made it
possible for parents to identify a broader array of defects in utero. By the late
1960s, amniocentesis—a procedure used to detect chromosomal abnormalities—
had become a common obstetric procedure.56 In 1968, the New York Times
reported that many area hospitals performed abortions if physicians detected a
chromosomal abnormality, especially in cases of Down Syndrome.57 Indeed, the
Times suggested that physicians were the most willing to perform therapeutic
abortions in cases of fetal defect.58
Notwithstanding the growing support for abortion in cases of disability,
abortion reformers moved away from the disability-based arguments of the early
1960s. Frustrated by the results observed in states with the ALI proposal in place,
ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT’S RULING 24–25 (2010) (discussing the American Law Institute’s 1962 abortion
policy).
51
See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Roe’s Race: The Supreme Court, Population Control, and
Reproductive Justice, 25 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 12–14 (2013) (discussing Planned
Parenthood’s 1960’s argument that “unwanted children . . . created the delinquency that the
government sought to prevent”).
52
William Vogt, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1955.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text.
57
Robert Reinhold, Abortions Linked to Genetic Defect: Fetal Tests Said to Be Used
as Basis for Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1968, at 19.
58
Id.
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the leaders of pro-choice groups concluded that nothing less than complete repeal
of abortion restrictions would ensure meaningful access to abortion.59 Because
some of the statutory grounds for abortion could be interpreted narrowly, some
physicians in ALI states like California refused to perform the procedure.60
Convinced that the ALI bill had not worked, abortion reformers downplayed the
fetal-defect arguments sometimes used to support it. In 1966, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Southern California explained the reasoning of many
repeal groups:
There appears to be extensive public acceptance of [repeal when there
is] . . . a substantial risk that the offspring would be born with grave
mental or physical defects. . . . However, the ACLU of Southern
California believes that . . . the true issue is the individual’s fundamental,
personal right to determine when and whether to produce offspring
without interference by the state.61
In 1967, the national ACLU also began experimenting with constitutional
arguments, and leaders of the organization framed abortion as a constitutional
right—not a subject for legislative discretion.62 The following year, Planned
Parenthood (then known as Planned Parenthood-World Population) voted in favor
of a resolution demanding the repeal of all abortion bans.63 Like the ACLU
statement, the Planned Parenthood resolution framed legal abortion as a matter of
constitutional law involving the rights of patients to receive medical treatment and
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See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL,
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(explaining that “While this reform movement initiated changes in existing state legislation
to allow for therapeutic abortions, more militant voices called for repeal of all abortion
laws”); LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973, at 233–35 (1997) (explaining that various branches of
the abortion rights movement had adopted the position that all abortion laws had to be
repealed); STAGGENBORG, supra note 5, at 15–24 (describing the origins of the movement
to legalize abortion).
60
See, e.g., Keith Monroe, How California’s Abortion Law Isn’t Working, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1968, at 29.
61
Policy Statement on Abortion from the ACLU of Southern California (Sept. 21,
1966) (on file with the Schlesinger Library at Harvard University).
62
See Memorandum from William Kopit & Harriet F. Pilpol to Due Process
Committee (Dec. 7, 1966), 1–4, (on file with the Schlesinger Library at Harvard
University).
63
See, e.g., Morris Kaplan, Abortion and Sterilization Win Support of Planned
Parenthood: Proper Medical Procedures, Agency Says —Asks End of Laws Forbidding
Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1968, at 50 (explaining that Planned Parenthood-World
Population, for the first time in its 52 years as a national voluntary birth-control agency,
unanimously called for liberalizing the criminal laws that prohibit abortion and
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the rights of physicians to provide it.64 In 1969, when NARAL organized, the
group also used constitutional rhetoric to describe its goal.65
The reasons for the spread of constitutional justifications were evident in a
meeting held the same year for all reformers by the Abortion Reform Association
(ARA), a group that funded state level repeal efforts. In 1969, the ARA hosted a
strategy workshop for different groups supporting legal abortion.66 Attendees
agreed to demand nothing less than complete repeal and to describe abortion
primarily as “a woman’s civil right.”67 While frustrated with the functioning of
ALI-style statutes, attendees also argued that a rights-based formulation would
appeal to more women and “allay concerns about genocide.”68 In their own
organizations and groups dedicated to abortion reform, feminists embraced rights
arguments, seeing women’s interests as the central issue in the abortion debate.
Because fetal-defect justifications remained tied to an ALI proposal that many
found inadequate, the disability-based justifications fell somewhat out of favor.
As soon as the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, disability-based
justifications reemerged, this time as part of the response to the rise of an
increasingly sophisticated pro-life movement. In the late 1960s, reformers
continued relying on disability-based justifications for abortion under certain
circumstances, particularly when explaining the inadequacy of ALI-style bills.69
Garret Hardin, an ecologist and supporter of population control policies, published
an article arguing that the ALI would not allow abortions in many cases of fetal
defect.70 As Hardin explained, women whose children had severe fetal
abnormalities might still have been denied an abortion under the ALI statute
because the probability of defect in a particular case was too low or because they
did not have access to prenatal testing that would reveal the existence of an
abnormality.71 Roy Lucas, one of the attorneys who would help engineer the
challenge in Roe v. Wade, echoed Hardin’s argument.72 While reminding the
American public of the value of abortion in cases of disability or defect, Hardin
and Lucas argued that only the complete repeal of abortion restrictions would
guarantee women the power to terminate pregnancies in cases of fetal defect.73
64
65

32.
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Id.
See New Group Will Seek Changes in Abortion Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1969, at

See Report of Attendance at a Workshop of the Abortion Reform Association (Oct.
10–11, 1969) (on file with the Schlesinger Library at Harvard University).
67
Id.
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See Garret Hardin, Abortion or Compulsory Pregnancy?, 30 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
246, 246–51 (1968).
70
See id.
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See, e.g., id. (explaining that the probability of defective embryos is generally low
and women often did not have access to abnormality-revealing prenatal testing).
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See Roy Lucas et al., Abortion: Litigative and Legislative Processes, 1 HUM. RTS.
23, 31 (1971).
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See id.; Hardin, supra note 69, at 246–51.
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When the pro-life movement began making progress, groups like NARAL
also turned to disability-based justifications to explain the need for repeal. Starting
in the mid-1960s, as states began considering the reform or repeal of existing laws,
an opposition mobilized to defend existing bans.74 Often supported by local
Catholic dioceses, early pro-life groups began experimenting with images of late
term abortions as a tool to defeat referenda and persuade legislators.75 Dr. John
Willke of Ohio perfected a slide show later used in many states to heighten public
discomfort with abortion.76 At times, pro-lifers using these images had great
success. Before Roe, New York, one of the few states to repeal all abortion
restrictions, passed a law reinstituting old restrictions before Governor Nelson
Rockefeller vetoed the measure.77 In 1972, pro-lifers in Michigan defeated a
proposed referendum legalizing abortion.78 The images circulated by the pro-life
movement clearly resonated with an ambivalent public.
The leaders of the pro-choice movement recognized the need to develop an
effective reply to the images deployed by the opposition. NARAL leaders used
disability-based arguments to help counter the fetal-rights strategy that pro-lifers
had used so effectively. The organization’s pre-1973 debate manual included a
claim that “[l]egal abortion could decrease the tragedy of the birth of deformed
children.”79
In 1972, disability-based arguments again attracted attention after NARAL
members participated in a major television debate.80 During the event, pro-lifer
Marjory Mecklenburg stunned the audience by displaying an aborted fetus.81
Frustrated by the outcome, NARAL leader Larry Lader urged his colleagues to
avoid a similar debacle by drawing on the shock value of fetal defects.82 “When
they bring up innocent fetal life,” Lader advised, “keep hammering on . . . the
deformed and unwanted infant, . . . the horror of bringing a deformed child into the
world with half a head, no arms, etc.”83 The group later developed visual materials
74

On the early pro-life movement, see ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE
ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS 192 (2008); Keith
Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement: Sources, Development, and Strategies, in THE
POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Donald T.
Critchlow ed., 1996).
75
See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 32–33 (explaining that some pro-life groups
used images of aborted fetuses).
76
See, e.g., id. (describing the effects the slideshows had on the public).
77
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 47 (1992)
(explaining that, in 1970, New York repealed its abortion law and that the legislature
considered and almost passed a reform law).
78
See, e.g., STAGGENBORG, supra note 5, at 35–38 (talking about the strength of the
anti-abortion movement).
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80
See, e.g., LARRY LADER TO NARAL BOARD MEMBERS, supra note 9 (describing
the “shock technique” to be used on television).
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that similarly spotlighted fetal defects.84 As one prominent pamphlet explained:
“Legal abortion means . . . women can’t be forced to bear a deformed child. Which
do you prefer . . . legal abortion? Or an anencephalous ‘baby’?”85
Before Roe, disability-based arguments helped activists explain why nothing
less than complete repeal would serve the needs of the American public. Instead of
merely arguing for abortion in cases of fetal defect, pro-choice advocates insisted
that nothing short of repeal would ensure that women could terminate pregnancies
when providers detected a fetal abnormality. At the same time, as pro-lifers
perfected visual images of abortion, supporters of legalization used images of
disability and defect to invoke the fear, disgust, and anxiety often elicited by the
opposition.
After the Roe Court struck down most of the nation’s remaining abortion
laws,86 the politics of disability and abortion shifted. Seeking to make the most of
their victory in the Supreme Court, pro-choice activists downplayed concerns
about fetal defects in favor of arguments about a woman’s right to choose. As
feminists took the helm of organizations like NARAL and Planned Parenthood,87
movement leaders directed more attention to arguments about the liberty and
equality of women. As the decade progressed, however, pro-lifers took up the issue
of disability, using it to argue for the reversal of Roe and the importance of the
right to life. While abortion opponents had argued against abortion in cases of fetal
defect since the mid-1960s, the new disability arguments were more ambitious.
Pro-lifers argued that as long as abortion remained legal, the nation was on its way
down a slippery slope that threatened all disabled and vulnerable persons.88 This
slippery-slope argument helped pro-lifers appeal to those ambivalent about
abortion and reinforced their claim that abortion opponents, not those on the other
side, stood up for civil rights.
B. Pro-Lifers Use Disability to Describe a Slippery Slope
After Roe, the pro-life movement committed to passing a constitutional
amendment that would outlaw abortion from coast to coast.89 Starting in 1973,
Congress considered a variety of proposals that would amend the Constitution, all
of them designed to change the Fourteenth Amendment.90 Well before the
84

See, e.g., Pamphlet, “Legal Abortion Means . . .” (n.d., ca. 1972), in The NARAL
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See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 121–26 (describing how feminists used the
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See infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court’s 1973 decision, pro-life activists had argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment recognized the personhood of the unborn child and protected the fetus
under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.91 As part of this
argument, the leaders of groups like the National Right to Life Committee
(NRLC), the largest national antiabortion organization, sought to position their
cause as an extension of the social-justice movements of the 1960s, particularly the
civil rights movement.92 Far from presenting themselves as another conservative
group, pro-life organizations identified with social movements championing the
rights of the helpless and defenseless.93
After Roe, in developing an ideal constitutional proposal, pro-lifers reinforced
this argument by guaranteeing a right to life not only for the fetus but also for the
disabled and the elderly. Americans United for Life (AUL), the group that would
become the nation’s leading pro-life public interest law firm, argued that the
group’s purpose was: “To impress upon all the dignity and worth of each
individual life, whatever the state or circumstance, especially mindful of the
innocent, the incompetent, the impaired, the impoverished, the aged, and all those
otherwise weak and disadvantaged.”94 Struggling with financial difficulties and
political isolation, NRLC leaders seeking to broaden their base argued that legal
abortion was just the beginning of a dangerous trend that would threaten other
Americans.95 In a 1975 pamphlet, the NRLC described this risk as follows: “The
questions we must ask ourselves are these: if we allow the killing of the unborn
now, where does it end?”96 The same year, the organization circulated materials
arguing that the noble dedication to human life is compromised in the increasing
attack on individual human life evidenced in abortion, the increasing advocacy of
infanticide of the defective child, and euthanasia.97
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Convinced that the pro-life movement could remain unified only if the NRLC
and sister organizations focused exclusively on abortion, leading groups often
deemphasized disability issues and pushed the slippery-slope argument only so
far.98 However, for much of the 1970s, moderate antiabortion groups, including
American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL), made concern about disability
discrimination more central to their argumentative agenda.99 In the mid-1970s,
when neither major political party took a clear stand on abortion, influential
abortion opponents in Congress, the academy, and leading pro-life groups worked
with ACCL partly because they worried that a single issue approach would never
convince politicians to ban abortion.100 ACCL leaders emphasized the importance
of “present[ing] the pro-life cause and its responsibility in terms of broadly based
concern for human life rather than narrowly focusing on the fetus only” and
“establish[ing] the pro-life cause as a legitimate bi-partisan concern.”101
To achieve this goal, ACCL tried to define a pro-life agenda that would
protect the handicapped as well as fetal life. “American Citizens Concerned for
Life is committed to working toward a [world] in which all lives are respected,”
the organization explained in promotional materials.102 “This protective and
enabling philosophy of action is not limited to abortion alone but applies to other
vulnerable classes and individuals, such as the mentally retarded, the aged, and the
handicapped.”103 In concrete terms, the organization advocated for additional
funding for research on the prevention of birth defects and developed model
legislation on end-of-life issues for the disabled.104
Throughout the 1970s, pro-life groups used the idea of disability
discrimination to attack legal abortion. In the early 1980s, when the nation dealt
98
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with a new controversy surrounding the treatment of severely disabled newborns,
pro-life groups made disability arguments a more central part of their message and
strategy.105 Abortion opponents channeled more resources into battling laws
involving the withdrawal of treatment and aid-in-dying.106 At the same time,
groups like the NRLC emphasized disability-based concerns even in the battle
about reproductive rights.107 Activists presented pro-choice organizations as
heartless and indifferent to the struggles of weak, vulnerable, and handicapped
persons. Moreover, by pointing to the early relationship between family planners
and eugenic legal reformers, antiabortion leaders emphasized that genetic
engineering, not women’s rights, explained their opponents’ commitment to legal
abortion. While Planned Parenthood and early family planning organizations
sometimes clashed with the eugenic legal reform movement and pursued a
different agenda, pro-lifers could score political points by highlighting the prior
partnership between the two factions and downplaying the differences between
eugenic supporters, family planners, and the modern pro-choice movement.
C. The Baby Doe Controversy Makes Disability Arguments a Core Weapon
Notwithstanding pro-life arguments about a slippery slope, in the early 1980s,
abortion in cases of fetal defect seemed more popular than ever. As early as 1976,
Congress had allocated over $90 million for research, prevention, and
identification of fetal defects, and access to prenatal genetic counseling slowly
increased.108 By 1981, access to counseling had become so widespread that the
Food and Drug Administration considered bringing to market a consumer product
that could detect common genetic abnormalities.109 As Jane Brody of the New York
Times explained: “[I]t might soon become culturally ‘acceptable and even expected
to avoid the birth of a defective child.’”110
By 1982, however, the so-called Baby Doe controversy made the rights of
disabled newborns more hotly debated than ever. In 1982, in Bloomington,
Indiana, a child born with Down Syndrome suffered from esophageal atresia, a
defect that physicians could often correct with surgery.111 The child’s parents
105
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declined surgery, and the infant died.112 President Ronald Reagan responded by
ordering the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to withhold federal
funding from any public health care facility that refused to provide lifesaving care
to severely handicapped newborns, citing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a
forerunner of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that outlawed disability
discrimination in federal programs.113
In March 1983, HHS issued regulations based on the Rehabilitation Act,
prompting a coalition of health care providers to file suit.114 In American Academy
of Pediatrics v. Heckler, the district court struck down the rules on procedural
grounds.115 The same year, Baby Jane Doe was born in Long Island, New York.116
Jane Doe also suffered from a defect correctable with surgery, but because of
several handicaps, physicians informed her parents that she would be severely
physically and mentally handicapped even if she survived.117 When Jane Doe’s
parents initially refused surgery, a pro-life attorney, Larry Washburn, sought
appointment as guardian ad litem in state court, and the Reagan Justice Department
asked the federal courts to intervene, invoking the Baby Doe Rules to force the
hospital to release medical records.118
In the meantime, in January 1984, the Reagan Administration issued final
Baby Doe Rules, and Congress amended the federal Child Abuse Prevention and
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Treatment Act to cover disabled newborns.119 After the American Medical
Association and the American Hospital Association again attacked the Baby Doe
Rules, the case eventually reached the Supreme Court.120 In Bowen v. American
Hospital Association, the Court struck down the regulations, holding that
mandatory requirements outlined in the rules found no justification in the
Rehabilitation Act.121
The Baby Doe wars transformed the priorities and message of antiabortion
groups. Calling the Baby Doe conflict “a landmark in the rights of infants,”
Washburn and his allies developed a network of nurses who would report on the
perceived mistreatment of handicapped newborns.122 AUL held its first major
conference about Baby Doe litigation and legislation, and by 1984, the
organization committed half of its budget to fighting what members saw as
euthanasia.123 Other pro-life groups stepped up their involvement in end-of-life
debates. In 1984, James Bopp, Jr., the general counsel for the NRLC, founded the
National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled, a public-interest
litigation group designed to focus “primarily on the medical and legal issues in the
treatment of the critically or terminally ill handicapped and medically dependent
persons.”124 Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, an NRLC affiliate, argued that
the right to die, including the withdrawal of treatment, threatened “a wide range of
people,” including the “aged, the mentally ill, the retarded, etc.”125
In the mid-1980s, pro-life activists and political figures soon took up
arguments against amniocentesis and genetic screening as well as abortion. In the
first part of the decade, Surgeon General Edward Koop, a vocal critic of abortion,
condemned amniocentesis as a “search and destroy mission” that would encourage
more women to terminate their pregnancies.126 In 1987, the Vatican issued a
119
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statement condemning any use of prenatal screening that would lead to abortion as
“gravely illicit.”127 Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, the chairman of the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Pro-Life Committee, backed the Pope’s position:
“If we are not comfortable with turning the creation of human life into an
impersonal or ‘pick and choose’ process, what principles exist to restrain such
activity?”128
Concerned that pro-lifers would use arguments against amniocentesis to limit
abortion access, some pro-choice politicians and activists began defending
women’s right to terminate pregnancies in cases of fetal defect or disability. In
Illinois, state pro-life groups lobbied for a bill that would allow physicians to
refuse to perform amniocentesis for reasons of conscience.129 While Illinois prolifers reiterated arguments about the “eugenic” motives of many women seeking
abortion, the leader of a state affiliate of the ACLU labeled the law “immoral,”
insisting that under such a statute, “pregnant women would be denied vital medical
information to make informed decisions.”130
As the Illinois controversy suggested, pro-choice groups soon leveraged
anxiety about fetal abnormality to counter a new pro-life attack on late-term
abortion. That campaign gained momentum in 1987, when the NRLC began
screening the Silent Scream, a short film that supposedly showed the abortion of a
19.5 week-old fetus.131 Hoping to benefit from longstanding public discomfort
with late term abortions, groups like the NRLC emphasized the film’s claim that
“[l]ate abortion was especially odious.”132 In trying to render the Silent Scream less
effective, pro-choice leaders fell back on popular support for access to abortion in
cases of disability. Citing the fact that most women did not have amniocentesis
until late in pregnancy, Douglas Gould of Planned Parenthood insisted that women
had late-term abortions “for some of the most compelling reasons imaginable,”
including those based on disability.133
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, NARAL’s debating guidebook, Choice,
also foregrounded arguments about fetal defects. In responding to arguments about
amniocentesis, NARAL included the following arguments:
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Less than 3% of such tests result in abortion. The tests permit parents
who know they are at risk of giving birth to a child with birth defects to
conceive. . . . It is heartless to deny parents access to medical technology
that would permit them to avoid giving birth to an incurably ill or
severely retarded infant.134
In part, NARAL argued that genetic counseling and amniocentesis did not
necessarily lead to abortion and might actually convince some parents to carry a
pregnancy to term. Nevertheless, as Gould did in response to the Silent Scream,
NARAL framed permitting abortion for reasons of disability and defect as
legitimate and compassionate. NARAL suggested that any compassionate
lawmaker would understand the reasons that parents wished to avoid “giving birth
to an incurably ill or severely retarded infant.”135
In the debate manual, the threat of fetal defects also represented a primary
rationale for keeping late-term abortions legal.136 The manual included a common
pro-life argument that women waited too long for abortions and too often sought
out the procedure after the first trimester.137 In the proposed response, the manual
highlighted that most fetal defects, including those detected by amniocentesis,
could not be discovered until later in pregnancy.138
Later in the 1990s, the pro-life movement focused on banning a particular late
term abortion procedure, D&X, that activists labeled partial birth abortion.139 For
pro-choice leaders, the risk of fetal defects helped to counter the quest to ban a
procedure that many in the public opposed.140 Pro-lifers framed D&X as a
procedure providers performed for reasons of convenience.141 Those leading
organizations like NARAL replied that providers used D&X only in rare and
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morally compelling cases, including instances of fetal defects.142 The logic of the
partial-birth abortion debate assumed that fetal disabilities counted among the most
reasonable grounds for choosing abortion.
D. The Partial-Birth Abortion Battle Revives Disability-Based Justifications
In the mid-1990s, when pro-lifers led a battle against D&X, pro-choice groups
put new emphasis on disability-based justifications for abortion. The pro-life
movement zeroed in on D&X because of public discomfort with late-term
abortions.143 Describing D&X in great detail, abortion opponents inside and
outside of Congress asserted that women having abortions late in pregnancy had no
legitimate reason to do so.144 In arguing against the so-called “partial-birth”
abortion ban, pro-choice groups emphasized that providers used D&X as a
measure of last resort—in cases in which a woman’s health could be compromised
or a child would be born with grave abnormalities.145 For leading pro-choice
groups, fetal disability remained one of the unquestionable arguments for choosing
abortion.
However, the partial-birth abortion debate forced some in the pro-choice
movement to reconsider how to handle justifications for abortion that made many
uncomfortable. Because the struggle focused on the issue of fetal abnormalities,
disability-rights activists questioned the ease with which many turned to abortion
in fetal-defect cases.146
Although the disability-rights movement had mobilized earlier and scored
important victories in Congress and the courts, by the late 1990s, concern about
142
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disability discrimination became mainstream.147 Worried about alienating
handicapped individuals and their families, some in the pro-choice movement
questioned the value of disability-based arguments for abortion.148 Recognizing
that disability-based justifications could be a strategic handicap for those on the
other side, the pro-life movement also experimented with abortion bans explicitly
based on disability discrimination, including those prohibiting the abortion of
children with Down Syndrome.149
In 1995, Ohio became the first state to ban elective use of D&X.150 By
September 1996, Congress had passed a federal ban.151 With late abortions center
stage, the pro-choice movement found itself in a politically difficult position. A
July 1996 Gallup Poll found that more than 70% of respondents favored a
prohibition on D&X.152
President Bill Clinton sparked considerable controversy when he vetoed the
ban.153 Republican leaders used the partial-birth abortion ban to present pro-choice
activists as dangerous extremists. Senator Bob Dole, a leading Republican in
Congress, argued that the pro-choice movement’s rejection of a partial-birth
abortion ban reflected “the extreme position of those who support abortion at any
147
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time, at any place and for any reason.”154 Some claimed that physicians performed
partial-birth abortions for trivial reasons, including instances in which parents did
not want a child born with a cleft palate.155
The pro-choice movement responded by treating D&X as a measure of last
resort, available only in the most readily justifiable abortions.156 When Clinton
vetoed the bill, several women who had terminated pregnancies because their
children would have suffered from devastating fetal disorders joined him.157 A
strategy centered around disabilities, defects, and disorders would shape much of
the rest of pro-choice strategy in the partial-birth abortion wars, especially outside
of court. Whereas pro-life activists presented the ban as a modest effort to
recognize the value of fetal life ignored by women who waited too long to
terminate a pregnancy,158 Kate Michelman, the leader of NARAL, maintained that
Clinton had “chosen compassion and concern for families facing medical
tragedies. . .”159
The partial-birth abortion struggle soon revolved around the legitimacy of all
late-term abortions. Michelman defended abortions late in pregnancy by arguing
that “late-term abortions are used to protect a woman’s health or life or because of
grave fetal abnormality.”160 Pro-lifers responded that all abortion decisions—
including those late in pregnancy—came for frivolous reasons.161 The National
Conference of Catholic Bishops ran an ad campaign arguing that women had
partial birth abortions because they “w[ouldn]’t fit into [their] prom dress.”162
Although Clinton promised to sign a version of the bill with a health exception,
Congress passed the ban without any such exception, and Clinton vetoed the bill
again in the fall of 1997.163
The central role of fetal defects in the partial-birth abortion wars prompted
pro-choice leaders to take stock of the arguments used to defend abortion rights. In
1998, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Roe, NARAL hosted a strategy session about how to develop the
strongest protections for abortion.164 Participants focused on how the rise of preconception and pre-implantation genetic screening could help or hurt the cause of
legal abortion. These technological shifts, as one participant put it, had
154
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“invigorated the debate around private eugenics as opposed to government
sponsored public eugenics.”165 Another attendee noted: “Disability-rights people
raised the question about whether aborting [a pregnancy] . . . demeans what it
[means] to be a human being with a disability.”166 By treating disability as nothing
more than a justification for abortion, activists did not leave room for solutions that
acknowledged the moral ambiguity of disability-based abortion.
Notwithstanding activists’ qualms about the disability politics of abortion,
pro-choice groups continued relying on exceptions to partial-birth abortion bans
involving severe fetal abnormalities.167 After the election of George W. Bush in
2000, the pro-life movement believed that the passage of a ban on D&X had
become inevitable.168 In 2003, Congress once again debated the ban.169 By the time
Congress took up the issue, more than thirty states had banned D&X.170 Opponents
of the ban continued arguing that the law should, at a minimum, allow for abortion
in cases of severe fetal abnormalities.171 President Bush signed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act of 2003 into law,172 but over the course of the following decade,
abortion opponents would soon use disability-based arguments for their own
purposes.
E. Pro-Life Activists Use Disability Politics to Restrict Abortion
Starting in the mid-2000s, abortion opponents began transforming the
disability-based justifications many had used to defend abortion to demand new
restrictions on access to the procedure. In 2004, conservative commentator Ramesh
Ponneru criticized parents and providers for reflexively aborting disabled
fetuses.173 In 2009, in the Human Life Review, a major pro-life publication, activist
165
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and writer Mary Meehan wrote an article describing what she characterized as “the
deep influence of eugenics . . . in encouraging prenatal testing and eugenic
abortion.”174 As Ponneru recognized, many Americans continued to favor access to
abortion in cases of disability or defect.175 If abortion opponents could convince
Americans to oppose disability-based abortion, pro-lifers could turn a longstanding
weapon available to pro-choice leaders into a political trap.
Gradually, abortion opponents began translating arguments against disabilitybased abortion into concrete legal prohibitions. In 2013, after Arizona passed a law
banning abortions after twenty weeks, activists in the state questioned the
constitutionality of the law.176 In particular, physicians challenging the law argued
that it would unnecessarily prevent women from pursuing abortions in cases of
“severe or lethal fetal anomaly.”177 A pro-life group, the Center for Bioethics,
framed the pursuit of disability-based abortion as a reason to restrict abortion, even
before the point of fetal viability.178 Noting that most abortions after twenty weeks
took place after the discovery of a defect or disability, the Center urged the Court
to disavow disability-based abortions.179 Nikolas Nikas of the Center reasoned:
“Aborting children with disabilities is a form of discrimination that threatens to
devalue the lives of people born and living with disabilities.”180
In recent years, a disability-based strategy has continued to advance in prolife circles. In 2013, in North Dakota, activists promoted a law that would outlaw
abortion when a parent wanted to prevent the birth of a child with Down Syndrome
or another disability.181 The disability ban passed, alongside more stringent
restrictions that banned abortion as early as six weeks when a fetal heartbeat could
be detected.182 Abortion providers in the state argued that the fetal-heartbeat law
174
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clearly outlawed a large fraction of pre-viability abortions and therefore constituted
an undue burden under Planned Parenthood v. Casey.183
Disability-based bans again took center stage in 2015. In January, Indiana
state legislators considered a bill that would ban abortions performed because of an
actual or potential physical or mental disability such as Down Syndrome.184 Soon
after, Texas legislators proposed an informed consent law designed to discourage
abortion in cases of Down Syndrome.185 In May, Ohio legislators began hearings
on a law that would ban abortions pursued only because a fetus was diagnosed
with Down Syndrome.186 “Choosing to end a person’s life simply because of this
diagnosis is discrimination, period,” explained Representative Sarah LaTourette,
one of the chief sponsors of the law.187 Bills in Ohio and Missouri are pending at
the time of this writing, and the fate of the Indiana statute signed into law remains
TIMES (July 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/us/judge-blocks-north-dakotaabortion-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/DRD7-3L99] (noting that with a few
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unclear following a federal court decision enjoining enforcement on constitutional
grounds.188 The AUL has drafted model legislation available to other states that
want to follow suit.189
As Part II shows, the kind of measure proposed in Ohio has both functional
and constitutional flaws that make it unworkable. However, as the history of
disability and abortion suggests, motive-based bans will still influence the law and
politics of abortion even if those statutes are never enforced.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH DISABILITY-BASED ABORTION BANS
In 2013, North Dakota enacted House Bill 1305, which prohibits any provider
from performing an abortion when she knows that the procedure is sought solely
for purposes of sex selection or because the fetus has been diagnosed with a
“genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”190 At present, the
Ohio bill would prohibit a provider from performing, inducing, or attempting to
perform an abortion if a woman “is seeking the abortion solely because of a test
result . . . or a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome in an unborn child.”191 The
AUL model legislation differs slightly from either statute. Like the North Dakota
law, the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act would outlaw sex selection and disabilitybased abortions.192 With respect to disability, the proposal would make it illegal for
any provider to intentionally perform an abortion with the knowledge that a
pregnant woman is seeking an abortion solely because a child has been diagnosed
either with Down Syndrome, genetic abnormality, or a potential of either.193
At least under current abortion doctrine, each proposal seems likely to fail the
undue burden test set out in Casey. Even if the Court modifies the Casey
framework, the bans currently proposed would do little to accomplish the goals of
the activists and legislators who proposed such a strategy. This Part takes up each
of these points in turn.
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A. The Constitutional Flaws of Disability-Based Bans
Under Casey, a state abortion regulation may not have the purpose or effect of
creating a substantial obstacle to a woman’s abortion decision.194 While
recognizing that the state has an interest in potential fetal life throughout a
pregnancy, a regulation must be calculated to “inform the woman’s free choice, not
hinder it.”195 States have the power to create “a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn” or to introduce laws designed to “persuade [women] to choose
childbirth over abortion.”196 Casey further upheld “truthful and non-misleading”
laws involving informed consent, as well as parental involvement restrictions that
provide a judicial bypass option for mature minors.197
The first problem with disability-based abortion bans involves the viability
principle upheld in Casey. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court permitted states to
advance an interest in protecting fetal life only after viability, the point at which a
child can survive outside the womb.198 While rejecting Roe’s trimester framework,
the Casey Court reaffirmed the importance of viability as a dividing line.199 In part,
Casey relied on the importance of stare decisis in reaching a decision.200
Nevertheless, the Casey Court found merit in drawing the line at viability.201 The
majority explained that viability was the most workable boundary for abortion
rights.202 As importantly, the Casey Court concluded that drawing the line at
viability was the fairest result.203 “In some broad sense,” the Court explained, “it
might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the
State’s intervention on behalf of the developing child.”204
Disability-bans outlaw all abortions chosen for a particular reason, both preand post-viability. Would this create the kind of burden described in Casey? While
the Court has decided only a handful of cases on abortion since 1992, the Justices’
decision in Gonzales v. Carhart205 offers some guidance. Carhart first offers
reason for skepticism about a challenge to disability bans under the Casey purpose
prong. The Court identified three legislative purposes supporting the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Act under the Casey framework—the “coarsen[ing] of
society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent
194
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human life,” the protection of the medical community and its reputation, and the
prevention of post-abortion regret.206
Arguably, several of these purposes might support a disability-based ban.
Carhart recognized a state interest in protecting all “vulnerable” life, a term that
could be understood to include the disabled.207 The interest in protecting the
integrity of the medical profession, as understood in Carhart, also arguably
supports a disability-based ban. Carhart emphasized the importance of preserving
the image of a profession tasked with saving life.208 Arguably, disability-based
abortions would undermine that image. Of course, the Carhart Court put particular
emphasis on the nature of D&X and its resemblance to infanticide.209 Disabilitybased abortions could take place at any point in pregnancy and would not
necessarily invoke the kind of disgust expressed by the majority in Carhart.210
Nevertheless, given the relatively generous reading of Casey’s purpose prong so
far used by a majority, a disability ban may well survive Casey’s purpose analysis.
Casey’s effect prong may well prove more problematic for disability-based
bans. Carhart is easily distinguishable from any case involving disability bans.
The Partial-Birth Abortion Act did not prevent women from having an abortion. At
most, the law ruled a particular procedure out of bounds. The effect analysis in
Carhart turned on whether the law should fail because it lacked an explicit
exception for women’s life or health.211 In the face of what the Court saw as
scientific uncertainty, the majority held that a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act failed.212 By contrast, for women motivated by a particular diagnosis,
disability-based bans make abortion of any kind impossible to access. Casey
explains that “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision,
not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”213 By outlawing abortion for
any woman choosing the procedure for one particular reason, disability-based bans
deprive women of the final say in a way that contravenes the principles set forth in
Casey.
The other regulations considered by the Casey Court also differ significantly
in their effect from a disability-based ban. This distinction becomes clear in
comparing a disability-based ban to restrictions upheld in Casey and its progeny.
The Casey Court first upheld an informed consent provision that forced a woman
to consider certain information about the gestational age of the fetus, the law of
206
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child support, and the details of the abortion procedure.214 The Court upheld the
requirement, explaining: “If the information the State requires to be made available
to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
permissible.”215
Casey also upheld a 24-hour waiting period provision.216 In analyzing this part
of the challenged statute, the Court repeated findings made by the district court
about the obstacles imposed by the waiting period: some women would have to
make two visits to the doctor and incur additional expenses to do so; women would
face potential harassment from antiabortion picketers on more than one occasion;
and some women would have difficulty explaining repeated absences to employers
or partners.217 While describing some of these findings as “troubling,” the Casey
Court distinguished the “increased costs and potential delays” created by the
waiting period from the kind of obstacle that would constitute an undue burden.218
At least on the record before the Court, Casey did not treat laws that made
abortions more difficult for some women to obtain as undue burdens.219
A disability-based ban, by contrast, makes abortion impossible to access at
any point in pregnancy for women who pursue the procedure for a particular
reason. Casey emphasizes the importance of allowing women to have the final say
because of the consequences, both symbolic and concrete, of reproductive
decisions.220 In practical terms, disability-based bans take these decisions away
from women entirely. In symbolic terms, such a ban substitutes the state’s
judgment about the reasons for terminating a pregnancy for a woman’s own.
Because Casey confirms that a woman must be the final decision maker in any
reproductive decision, disability-based bans are constitutionally problematic.
The Casey Court’s analysis of a spousal-notice provision reinforces this
concern.221 At the time of the litigation, Pennsylvania law prohibited any physician
from performing an abortion, absent a medical emergency, if a woman did not
certify in writing that she had informed her husband that she was terminating a
pregnancy.222 The law also created an exemption for a woman certifying in writing
that she was pregnant as the result of spousal sexual assault, that her husband did
not impregnate her, that she could not locate her husband, or that she feared death
or serious injury if she did notify her husband.223
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Notwithstanding these exemptions, the Court concluded that the law
constituted an undue burden.224 Emphasizing the possibility of domestic violence,
the Court explained:
The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not
merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for
many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind
ourselves to the fact that the significant number of women who fear for
their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from
procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed
abortion in all cases.225
In Casey, it was not dispositive that many women did not face the possibility
of domestic violence.226 For those women who were in abusive relationships, the
law created an insurmountable obstacle to abortion access. Similarly, in the context
of disability-based abortion, many women may pursue abortion for other reasons.
Nevertheless, for those women who do wish to terminate a pregnancy after a test
for Down Syndrome or some other disability, access to abortion would be just as
limited as it would if the state had outlawed abortion altogether.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt227 may cast even more doubt on the constitutionality of disability-based
abortion bans. Whole Woman’s Health involved a challenge to two Texas laws, a
measure requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a nearby
hospital and a provision requiring clinics to comply with the regulations governing
ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs).228 By a vote of 5 to 3, the Court struck down
both provisions, concluding that Casey required courts to balance the benefits and
costs of abortion restrictions and reasoning that states could not claim a benefit to
women without substantial evidence backing their claims.229 Whole Woman’s
Health made the undue-burden test much more rigorous, making it less likely that
any abortion regulation will survive in Court.230 Moreover, the decision signaled
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that the Court was not yet willing to retreat from Casey, suggesting that “nothing
in Roe, Casey, or any other subsequent Supreme Court decisions suggests that a
woman’s right to choose an abortion prior to viability can be restricted if exercised
for a certain reason.”231
At a minimum, pre-viability, disability-based bans seem constitutionally
problematic. Pro-lifers in major social-movement organizations and state
legislatures have introduced a variety of other laws that clearly seem
unconstitutional under Casey, including the heartbeat law on the books in North
Dakota. These laws represent an educated guess that the Supreme Court will
undermine at least some of the protections that Casey creates. Even if this bet pays
off, however, disability-based bans are unlikely to accomplish their goal.
B. Disability-Based Bans Are Difficult to Enforce
Even if disability-based bans were constitutional, there are obvious obstacles
in the way of their enforcement. The North Dakota law and the AUL model law
prohibit physicians from performing abortions motivated solely by fetal
abnormality, whereas the Ohio law outlaws abortions performed at least partly
because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis.232 None of these proposals explain how
physicians are to determine why a woman is requesting an abortion.233 One
possibility is that physicians could learn of a test result from reviewing relevant
medical records and presume that women will choose to abort after a diagnosis of
Down Syndrome or some other fetal disability. However, this presumption does
not hold up to close scrutiny. Some parents will (or will not) choose to terminate a
pregnancy for a variety of reasons, ranging from moral convictions about abortion,
religious beliefs about human life, and ideological positions on disability
discrimination.
As a second possibility, providers could ask women why they pursued an
abortion and take their patients at their word. Relying on such a strategy seems
extremely naïve. Abortion providers—many of whom might be expected to
disagree with the existence of a disability-based ban—might easily frame a
question in such a way as to put women on notice about which grounds for
?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2QDS-X34K]; Amanda Hollis-Brusky and Rachel VanSickleWard, Here Are Two Ways that Breyer’s Wonky Opinion in Whole Woman’s Health Could
Transform Abortion Politics, WASH. POST (July 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
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abortion are permissible or tell a woman that only certain reasons for abortion are
legally permissible. To be sure, providers have no obvious duty to ask under any of
the proposals under consideration at the time of this writing. Moreover, women
seeking an abortion have every reason to stay silent about their reasons for
choosing to terminate. Women committed to ending a pregnancy will not reliably
volunteer information that will prevent providers from performing a procedure.
Intent is notoriously difficult to prove, as the Court’s jurisprudence under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act makes clear.234 Absent an admission of what motivates a decision,
courts may rely on circumstantial evidence that would discredit a permissible
explanation of a particular action.235 In the Title VII context, for example,
statistical evidence about an employer’s failure to hire minorities may show a raceneutral explanation is pretextual.236 So too might comparator evidence—the
differing treatment of a person who resembled a claimant in every way excluding
her membership in a protected class.237 In the context of disability and abortion, it
is hard to imagine what kind of circumstantial evidence might exist. For the most
part, women seeking abortions are not repeat players, and physicians may lack the
context or experience that would allow them to second-guess women’s
explanations of their own request.
Worried about the shortcomings of a strategy based on freedom from state
interference, scholars have argued for reproductive justice, a more robust
alternative that rejects the individualism in favor of recognition that “the ability of
234
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any woman to determine her own reproductive destiny is linked directly to the
conditions in her community—and these conditions are not just a matter of
individual choice and access.”238 In the context of disability, however, mainstream
pro-choice groups have not consistently learned the lesson offered by supporters of
reproductive justice. Instead of explaining why women may terminate pregnancy
in cases of disability and addressing the community conditions that make those
decisions more likely, activists have often framed disabilities as nothing more than
a logical reason for individual women to seek abortion.
The disconnect between reproductive justice and the disability politics of
abortion matters. Abortion opponents leverage concern about disability and
abortion in seeking a variety of restrictions, some of which may have more staying
power than the bans now under consideration. In Congress and the states, pro-lifers
have spotlighted concern about disability discrimination in pushing for bans on
abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy.239 Logically, abortion opponents
could use the same reasoning to lobby for laws restricting access to prenatal and
pre-implantation genetic testing, amniocentesis, and other diagnostic tools.240 With
the spread of the Zika epidemic, more pregnant women may face the threat of
severe fetal abnormalities caused by the virus, and abortion opponents may turn to
strategies developed in the context of disability-based abortion bans.241 In these
contexts, disability arguments can create a credibility deficit for pro-choice
activists focused on women’s ability to make every reproductive choice, including
the decision to raise a child. By appealing to concern about discrimination,
antiabortion arguments of this kind may win over ambivalent politicians and
dampen the enthusiasm of those angry about abortion restrictions.
To address this danger, activists and lawyers should make disability rights a
central part of pro-choice work. Protecting women’s ability to make reproductive
decisions requires not only laws ensuring access to contraception, sex education,
and abortion but also legal reforms that address the conditions encouraging parents
to terminate pregnancies in cases of disability.
238
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III. REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY
While disability-based bans may not be enforceable, they may well change
the political conversation in ways that will make new restrictions on abortion more
likely. This Part begins by exploring potential side effects of the new focus on
disability and abortion. These side effects are both tangible and intangible. In
ideological terms, the focus on disability exposes a possible disconnect between
the treatment of disability by prominent pro-choice groups and a broader
commitment to reproductive justice. More concretely, a focus on disability creates
a potential credibility deficit that may smooth the way for new regulations of
women’s reproductive health. This Part examines possible solutions for the
problem disability-based bans have created for supporters of legal abortion.
A. The Side Effects of Disability-Based Bans
Disability-based abortion bans like the one under consideration in Ohio likely
will not prevent many disability-based abortions. That is not to say that these
regulations will leave the abortion debate unchanged. The first issue involves the
identity and message of those advocating for legal abortion. As this section shows,
starting in the 1990s, leading commentators, lawyers, and activists deemphasized
the language of choice, relying instead on a reproductive-justice framework.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, as this section argues, women of color raised new
questions about the rights framework that had long dominated the work of the prochoice movement. In 1994, after returning from the Cairo Conference on
International Population and Development, a caucus of African-American women
took inspiration from the comprehensive vision of reproductive health set forth in
international human rights law.242 The 1994 Cairo Programme of Action had
defined reproductive health as a human right, exposing the gap between pro-choice
rhetoric at home and the bolder agenda promoted abroad.243 At a meeting of the
Illinois Pro-Choice Alliance in Chicago, a group of African-American women
coined the term reproductive justice to describe the vision they identified with
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international human rights law.244 The idea of reproductive justice wove in familiar
attacks on the idea of choice, noting that poor and often non-white women lacked
the support and resources to control their own reproductive lives.245 As Loretta
Ross explained, choice-centered rhetoric “masked the ways that laws, policies and
public officials punish or reward the reproductive activity of different groups of
women differently.”246
The idea of reproductive justice reflected the work of established
organizations like the National Black Women’s Health Project (founded in 1984)
and the National Latina Health Organization (founded in 1986), many of which
raised concerns about a choice-centered framework in the late 1980s and early
1990s.247 After the mid-1990s, new groups like the SisterSong Women of Color
Reproductive Health Collective formed to champion the idea of reproductive
justice.248 To be sure, the push for reproductive justice in the mid-1990s bore some
fruit. Both NARAL and Planned Parenthood adopted broader reform agendas, and
the National Organization of Women (NOW) made welfare rights a priority.249
After 2010, mainstream organizations themselves adopted the rhetoric and
reasoning of reproductive justice. Beginning in 2011, frustrated at its inability to
reach younger women, Planned Parenthood conducted polling and focus groups
that revealed that a choice-centered message did not capture the range of issues,
including health care, insurance coverage, pay equity, and birth control coverage,
motivating many voters.250 In the 2014 election season, Planned Parenthood
responded by setting aside the rhetoric of choice, searching for arguments that
244
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resonated with more women and opening the door to a more in-depth discussion of
reproductive justice.251
As early as 2004, NOW’s national conference featured sessions on
reproductive justice.252 By 2014, the organization campaigned not only against
abortion restrictions but also against limits on contraceptive access.253 As the
organization’s materials explained: “NOW affirms that reproductive rights are
issues of life and death for women, not mere matters of choice.”254
Nor has interest in reproductive justice been limited to grassroots activists and
attorneys; scholars have also developed a rich theoretical framework to elaborate
on the ideas and experiences of grassroots champions of reproductive justice.255
Defined by the work of legal commentators like Dorothy Roberts and Robin West
and historians like Rickie Solinger, the new theory of reproductive justice makes a
compelling case for a more comprehensive approach to reproductive health.256
In the context of assisted reproduction, a disability-rights critique has
influenced scholars’ approach to disability-based abortion and other reproductive
issues.257 In the political arena, by contrast, disability-based arguments for abortion
remain a visible and important part of debate. Why has this gap developed? From
the beginning of the movement for abortion reform, disability-based justifications
for abortion enjoyed significant public support. When pro-life activists seem to
251
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have the upper hand, it is tempting to fall back on the “hard cases” that many
Americans see as justification for abortion, including those involving fetal
defects.258 However, as attitudes about disability shift, the short-term benefit
gained by using these arguments contrasts sharply with their potential long-term
costs.
First, by steering debate to disability-based abortions, pro-life politicians and
activists can more effectively question the value of the reproductive-justice
approach that mainstream pro-choice groups have started to embrace. A
reproductive-justice framework calls on supporters of legal abortion to go “beyond
a demand for privacy and respect for individual decision making to include the
social supports necessary for our individual decisions to be optimally realized.”259
Relatedly, reproductive justice activists seek to rectify “the isolation of abortion
from other social justice issues.”260 With respect to many reproductive-health
issues, groups like NOW and NARAL have adopted some of the logic associated
with a reproductive-justice framework.261 This move has important legal and
political consequences—allowing supporters of legal abortion to speak more
effectively to the concerns of women of color, to build cross-movement alliances,
and to develop a more comprehensive agenda.
Conventional disability-based justifications for abortion fit poorly in the
reproductive-justice framework. First, presenting disability as an obvious reason to
pursue abortion creates tensions between the pro-choice movement and potential
allies in the disability-rights movement. As importantly, the use of disability as a
justification for abortion stands in stark contrast to the reproductive-justice
commitment to changing the conditions in which women make choices. A wide
array of factors contributes to certain decisions about disability and abortion,
including a lack of governmental assistance, ignorance about the prognosis for
disabled children, and concern about the discrimination or stigma attached to
disability. By simply falling back on the assumption that disability-based abortions
are justifiable, pro-choice activists miss an important opportunity.
More concretely, the disability-based arguments refined in the fight for Down
Syndrome bans have already contributed to the success of new abortion restrictions
and will likely do the same in the future. In Congress and certain states, the
antiabortion movement has committed to the introduction of bans on abortion after
the 20th week of pregnancy.262 Eleven states have already passed such a ban, as
258

On the use of the “hard cases” terminology, see CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, THE
ETHICS OF ABORTION: WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN LIFE, AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE 187
(2015); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 242 (1996); BIOETHICS: A CULTURE WAR 8–9 (Nicholas C.
Lund-Molfese & Michael L. Kelly eds., 2004).
259
Ross, supra note 238, at 4.
260
Id.
261
See supra notes 249, 254, and 258 and accompanying text.
262
For analyses of twenty-week bans, see John A. Robertson, Symposium: Science
Challenges for Law and Policy: Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849,
1869–73 (2015); Manian, supra note 2, at 84–86.

626

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

did the House of Representatives in January 2015.263 In demanding these bans,
pro-life politicians and activists have highlighted the fact that a significant number
of late-term abortions occur because of a diagnosis of fetal abnormality.
Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), one of the leading proponents
of a twenty-week ban in the House, framed the bill partly as a remedy for disability
discrimination, emphasizing the experience of her own son with Down
Syndrome.264 In Ohio, activists connected a proposed 20-week ban with the Down
Syndrome prohibition by emphasizing that many women who terminated a
pregnancy after the first trimester did so because of a fetal abnormality.265
Assuming that the Court maintains viability as a dividing line, 20-week bans
will likely be found to create an undue burden under Casey. Although the precise
definition of viability is contested and fluid, a 20-week ban clearly would outlaw at
least some pre-viability abortions.266 Even though Whole Woman’s Health made
the undue-burden test more meaningful, the Court went out of its way to
emphasize that its decision did not conflict with Carhart, a decision that
emphasized that D&X is performed late in pregnancy in justifying a federal ban on
the procedure.267 In the near future, pro-life groups plan to target later term
abortions, seeing these procedures as vulnerable notwithstanding the outcome of
Whole Woman’s Health.268 Effectively combatting 20-week bans will require a
more nuanced response to the issue of disability and abortion. While affirming that
women should have the ultimate decision about whether to terminate a pregnancy,
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those fighting 20-week bans should explore solutions that would make abortions
on the basis of disability less likely.
The new focus on disability and abortion may also fuel new regulation of
prenatal testing. As Jaime Staples King has argued, limiting access to prenatal
diagnostic tools may accomplish what disability-based bans could not—limiting
the number of disability-based abortions.269 As is often the case with assisted
reproduction and other new technologies, it is far from clear how the courts would
resolve constitutional questions about restrictions on access to noninvasive
prenatal genetic diagnosis.270 Politically, it will be difficult for supporters of
reproductive justice to fend off restrictions on these technologies by continuing to
reflexively treat disability as a reason for abortion. The disability-rights movement
and its allies have complicated discussion of the issue in a way that would make
the arguments often used in the abortion dialogue a strategic liability.
What would a better response to the new disability-based bans involve? The
following section of this Article considers several proposals that should be
incorporated into a reproductive-justice agenda.
B. Disability Discrimination and the Preconditions for Reproductive Choice
By definition, a reproductive-justice agenda includes an effort to change the
conditions that push women to make some choices while putting others out of
reach. What are some of those conditions in the context of disability? To be sure,
the disability-rights movement has already changed the legal climate in significant
ways.271 Nevertheless, significant barriers remain that might influence potential
parents considering abortion. Notwithstanding the introduction of the ADA, only
one in five disabled Americans is employed.272 The poverty rate for disabled
Americans continues to be far higher than other groups, rising to roughly 32% in
2013 when only 11% of Americans without a work limitation fell below the
poverty line.273 Knowing that disabled children may struggle to live independently,
potential parents may hesitate to bring a pregnancy to term.
To change the conditions in which women consider the issue of disability,
supporters of reproductive justice should call for adequate support of disabled
children and adults under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)274 and Social
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Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) programs.275 At present, disabled children
under age 18 may receive SSI benefits, whereas adults with a disability that began
before age 22 may receive SSDI benefits.276 At a time when structural and cultural
barriers limit the employment opportunities of disabled Americans, a reproductivejustice agenda should involve calls for adequate annual funding under both
programs, as well as under Medicaid. Parents deciding about disability and
abortion would have a more meaningful choice if they knew that the government
would provide more meaningful financial support.
A reproductive-justice agenda should also include a commitment to removing
some of the barriers that deny employment and financial security to disabled
individuals with the capacity to work. The ADA already prohibits disability
discrimination and mandates the reasonable accommodation of disability in the
workplace.277 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires that the
government provide all disabled children a “free appropriate public education.”278
More recently, the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act provides expanded
access to training, education, and vocational rehabilitation for disabled individuals
transitioning from school to work.279 Finally, Congress acted in 2014 to pass the
Achieving Better Life Experience Act (ABLE Act), which allows disabled
individuals to save up to $14,000 in a tax-free account without jeopardizing
existing federal benefits.280
However, the causes of unemployment and poverty among the disabled are
far more complex. Some of the obstacles to employment for disabled Americans
stem from the inadequate funding of existing programs. Because of inadequate
funding for transportation initiatives like the Section 5310 transportation for
elderly persons and persons with disabilities program,281 many disabled Americans
face multi-hour commutes that prevent some individuals from taking certain
jobs.282 Disabled workers may have to take medical leave more often than their
counterparts without a work limitation. Although the federal Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) allows for 3 months of unpaid leave for qualifying workers,
not all disabled workers are covered by the Act, including those employed at
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smaller businesses or in part-time positions.283 Even those covered by the FMLA
may not be able to afford to take unpaid leave.284
A program of paid medical leave or a dramatic increase in transportation
funding may seem politically impossible at the time of this writing. Moreover,
employers refrain from hiring disabled individuals partly because of the perceived
added costs of doing so, including the price of accommodations mandated by the
ADA and FMLA.285 Adding a paid leave requirement might deter more employers
from hiring disabled workers in the first place.
At a minimum, even if more ambitious reforms seem out of reach, a
reproductive-justice agenda should include reasonable legislative steps that will
make it easier for disabled workers who can achieve economic independence to do
so. First, notwithstanding the introduction of the ABLE Act, other federal
programs discourage the kind of saving that helps workers climb out of poverty.
For example, under SSI, recipients have a $2,000 resource or asset limit for
eligible individuals and a $3,000 limit for couples.286 Since 1972, when Congress
first introduced the SSI program, the asset limitation has not kept up with
inflation—estimates of an adjusted asset limit would be more than four times
higher than those that currently apply.287 At present, disabled individuals face a
perverse incentive—any additional income or resources above the asset limit may
jeopardize the receipt of SSI benefits. Supporters of reproductive justice should
join other groups asking for an updating of SSI limits that will allow for more
saving and investment by disabled individuals without penalty.
Similarly, many disabled workers require attendant services to achieve
independence at home and at work. Most personal insurance policies do not cover
these services. For those who do not qualify for Medicaid, attendant services and
employment may be out of reach. Section 201 of the Ticket to Work and
Workplace Incentive Act creates a state-based, optional Medicaid buy-in program
for disabled individuals who would not otherwise be eligible for Medicaid, and a
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similar buy-in program operates under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.288 At
present, 46 states and the District of Columbia administer a Medicaid buy-in
(MBI) program.289
In practice, however, many states apply strict eligibility limits and limit
available services in a way that make buy-in programs useless to certain disabled
workers. In Texas, for example, disabled workers cannot make more than $2,475
per month to qualify for a buy-in program.290 The program does not cover
attendant services that some workers need to pursue meaningful employment.291 A
reproductive-justice agenda should include the campaign for a federal MBI law
that would set minimum service and eligibility requirements to create meaningful
access to needed services.
Finally, a reproductive-justice agenda should include an effort to continue to
remove the stigma that discourages employers from hiring disabled adults and
decreases the odds that parents will bring a pregnancy to term in cases of
disability. In economic terms, because of concerns that workers are not up to the
task or worry that accommodations will cost too much, employers still seem
reluctant to hire adults with disabilities. As Samuel Bagenstos has argued, the
stigma surrounding disability stems from “the legacy of a history of exclusion and
reflects a series of broader ideological developments.”292 The argumentative
strategy used by supporters of legal abortion should not rely on the stigma
surrounding disability. Instead, in explaining the reasons some parents choose
abortion in cases of disability, supporters of reproductive justice should do more to
challenge the inaccurate and politically charged stereotypes surrounding disability.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the disability politics of abortion seem to be a new feature of the
political terrain, the issue has a long history that shapes the legal opportunities
available today to those on either side of the abortion debate. Starting in the 1960s,
a diagnosis of fetal disability has served as a core justification for access to legal
abortion. Activists used disability first as an exception to sweeping bans on the
intentional termination of pregnancy. Over time, as demand for the repeal of all
288
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abortion restrictions intensified, arguments about fetal disability played a central
role in efforts to counter the impact of new arguments raised by the pro-life
movement.
After Roe, while pro-life activists raised concern about a slippery slope that
would threaten all disabled, elderly, and dependent Americans, pro-choice activists
continued turning to disability-based justifications when defending controversial
policies, including access to late-term abortion. Recently, as the disability-rights
movement has built political influence, pro-life activists have put more emphasis
on the issue of discrimination against the handicapped. Abortion opponents use
these arguments to justify motive-based abortion bans as well as prohibitions on
late-term abortions.
This history helps explain a strange disconnect between the disability politics
of abortion and a broader reproductive justice agenda. Because disability-based
justifications consistently enjoyed popular support, pro-choice activists in the
political arena strategically deploy such arguments when access to reproductive
health services comes under fire.
Increasingly, these short-term gains will come at a substantial cost. The
disability-based bans considered in Ohio and Indiana may not themselves make a
significant difference to abortion access. Constitutionally dubious and
unenforceable in practical terms, these bans will not do much to stop the abortions
targeted by statute. Nevertheless, the disability-discrimination arguments made in
support of such bans may resonate with legal and political audiences not usually
receptive to antiabortion rhetoric. Such claims have already fueled the push for
bans on abortion after the 20th week of pregnancy and may serve in new
campaigns to limit access to noninvasive prenatal diagnostic technologies or to ban
abortion following a Zika diagnosis.
To avoid these political traps, a meaningful reproductive-justice approach
should play down justifications for abortion based on disability. Instead, those
supporting access to legal abortion should take on some of the legal obstacles that
make it harder for parents to choose to bear and raise disabled children. Tackling
these obstacles, and encouraging legislators and judges to be more attentive to
them, can create a disability politics of abortion that accords with the value
supposedly endorsed by those on either side of the abortion question—the goal of
expanding equal treatment for those traditionally left behind in American politics.

